Sino-Indian Border Dispute: The Impossible Settlement, and Need of a New Framework – Part 3 of 4

Problematizing the Individualistic Approach

The individualistic framework requires a state-centric analysis, and takes into consideration the State’s motive as a causal factor for any inter-state event. In contextualizing the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, both countries accused the other of harbouring expansionist ambitions. However, the evidence points otherwise. In the case of China, the country had in the past made peaceful boundary settlements and even surrendered claim on ‘extensive tracts of land’, as was evident from the Sino-Burmese treaty of 1960.[i] Whilst in India’s case, the country displayed exceptional restraint in acquiring its own territory of Goa, which evidently belied the claims of Indian expansionism. Also, Nehru’s rejection of Ayub Khan’s offer to form a joint defence with Pakistan against China was evident of India’s effort to prevent war and not be expansionist.[ii]

Evidently, the threats were misplaced by both the countries, and misperceptions about expansionism had little factual grounding. As pointed by Garver, the two factors decisive in China’s decision of war against India were – a) ‘A perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet’, and b) ‘A perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression’, which was derived from the first factor.[iii] Whilst China was mistaken in perceiving the Tibetan threat to have emerged from India,[iv] India’s aggressive policies (Forward Policy) were based on misconceptions about Chinese expansionist policies on Indian ‘claimed’ borders.

If the aggressive policies of either State were in response to misperceived threats, who is to be blamed for the 1962 conflict? Misperceived threats? As mentioned in the previous parts, this paper does not intend to explore the causes of the conflict, rather attempt to provide a different approach that would better understand the dispute towards a possible settlement. To this end, a more pertinent question to ask would be – why did India and China perceived threat against each other in the first place, and why does this misperception continue in the present context?

In this part of the series, the paper problematizes the claims made by both countries as an inconclusive chapter, and in the latter part the paper argues against the ‘individualistic’ approach.

The individualistic approach does not take into account the anarchic world order, where no single country can play adjudicators and impose unilateral decisions on other countries. Attributing blame on either of the two countries, as seen in earlier sections, would be inconsequential given their equally substantive claims and allegations, and absence of any third party jurist to decide on arguments between India and China. Also, there exist no factual grounds against which the claims and accusations of either country could be verified. This problematizes the model of blame-attribution within the individualistic approach, as the blame-game is bound to result in perpetuating the conflicted relationship between India and China.

On the other hand, the extensive legal arguments by scholars from the two schools of thought have further substantiated both countries’ claim that – ‘what we demand is rightfully ours’. Such claims have limited the bargaining potential of both countries’ leadership on the negotiating table. Especially in India, where democratic governance compels the political leadership to consider public opinion, substantive claims of legitimacy on boundary areas have stalled any possibility of compromise. Moreover, negotiations over the boundary issue are deemed as a sign of weakness, and in the case of India the leadership’s decision to not negotiate is to ‘demonstrate toughness’.[v] This non-compromising posture by both India and China, backed by legal documents to prove their claims on the border areas, has pronounced an inconclusive verdict towards an unbiased judgement of the boundary dispute.

The individualistic framework is limited to charting out probable causes of the Sino-Indian border dispute that have further deepened the conflicted relationship, however it fails to explain as to why these causes emerged in the first place. Towards alleviating the tensions between India and China, the analysis requires going beyond the state-centred individualistic approach.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.

Richard Toppo, independent researcher, working on the issues of foreign policy and internal security, Master’s degree in Contemporary India, University of Oxford.
Maryam Aslany, PhD candidate at King’s College, London