Sino-Indian Border Dispute: The Impossible Settlement, and Need of a New Framework – Part 2 of 4

Allegations of Aggression: The Blame-Game between India and China

In the context of Sino-Indian conflict, attributing blame to either of the two countries would require a three-layered process: first of claiming legitimacy over the disputed areas, followed by alleging the other country of aggression for intruding in those disputed areas, and finally claiming the other country to be expansionist. Based on the self-perceived legitimacy over boundary claims, as seen in the previous part, both countries accused each other of aggressive intrusions. In this part of the series, the paper briefly summarizes the scholarly writings on allegations and counter-allegations of aggression between India and China, and the charges of expansionism against each other.

1.1. Allegations by India – Expansionist China

As per the Indian claims, incidents of Chinese intrusion were reported since 1954 with the first being reported in Barahoti in the middle sector. However, these reports never crossed the threshold of diplomatic squabbling. The first major incident that drew public attention occurred on September 1958, when an Indian patrol party was allegedly detained by the Chinese forces in Aksai Chin ‘for nearly five weeks, during which they were subjected to ill treatment.’[i]  It was in the same year that the Indian government lodged a protest against China for having ‘trespassed on India’s Ladakh region and built the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway through it without the knowledge of the government of India.’[ii] The first major military confrontation, as charged by India, occurred on August 7, 1959, when an approximate of 200 Chinese soldiers crossed into India’s Khinzemane and refused to withdraw. The situation was further aggravated when the Chinese soldiers allegedly crossed into India’s Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, and opened fire on Indian soldiers causing seventeen deaths.[iii]

In light of growing Chinese threat and non-conclusive diplomacy, the Indian government embarked on the ‘Forward Policy’ according to which Indian soldiers were to establish posts in the frontier areas of the boundary to keep the enemy [Chinese soldiers] in check. A large scale military confrontation had resumed by July 21, 1962 when the Chinese troops allegedly attacked an Indian patrol party in the region of Chip Chap River.[iv] In addition, the Indian government accused the Chinese forces for having established several military posts inside the Indian territory. The situation reached a critical phase when the Chinese forces allegedly attacked the Indian posts in India’s Che Dong area on October 9, 1962, causing seventeen deaths. Days later, on the 20^th of October, 1962, the Chinese forces launched a massive attack on the Indian frontiers ‘along the Kechilang River and in the Khinzemane area’ in the eastern sector, and the Galwan Valley and the Chip Chap Valley in the western sector.[v] China’s offensive ended on the 21^st of November, 1962, after it withdrew from the eastern sector to ‘positions twenty kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959’,[vi] while occupying Aksai Chin in the western sector.

For scholars supporting India’s claim, this attack confirmed their views on China as an expansionist state. Their writings further claimed that China’s expansionist plans were up for open display in the 1950s when ‘Chinese Liberation Army entered Tibet’,[vii] grossly violating the terms of Simla Agreement (1913-14) and seeking to ‘restore the territorial extent and eminence the Manchu Empire enjoyed in its heyday.’[viii]Noorani summed up China’s expansionist behaviour alleging that the Chinese were aware of the legal boundaries with India however they ‘were anxious to change them by grabbing our [Indian] territory and imposing on us [India] a settlement which could legalize their gains.’[ix]

1.2. Counter-allegations by China – Imperial India

China refuted all of India’s charges of aggression, and counter-charged the Indian forces of intruding into the ‘claimed’ Chinese territory. On the first incident of military confrontation, China accused the Indian forces for having ‘intruded into Wu-Je (called Hoti [Barahoti] by India) on June 29, 1954.[x] On the Aksai Chin incident of 1958, China claimed that the area was well within the Chinese territory and it were the Indian soldiers who had intruded in their (China’s) region.Refuting all similar accusations of aggression, China claimed that they were the victims of Indian intrusion instead. On the accusation of war against India, China refuted India’s allegation and claimed to have acted in self-defence against the provocative India’s ‘forward policy’.

Further, scholars supporting China’s claim accused India of embarking on an expansionist policy since independence, which wasevident in its (India’s) relation towards Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[xi]Pardesi quotes from China’s official Foreign Language Press: ‘[Nehru’s ambition since mid-1940s was the] establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India’s history… [that would] far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British empire.’[xii] Summed up by Peking Review, India sought to ‘impose on China a unilaterally defined boundary which it inherited from British imperialism.’[xiii]

Scholars stand firm on their grounds of accusation against either China or India, and this has further perpetuated longevity of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The two different schools of thought are yet to find a common ground, and this irreconcilability problematizes the ‘individualistic approach’.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.

Richard Toppo, independent researcher, working on the issues of foreign policy and internal security, Master’s degree in Contemporary India, University of Oxford.
Maryam Aslany, PhD candidate at King’s College, London