The swift annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 by Russia and ensuing insurgency in the Donetsk and Luhansk region forced Ukraine to intensify its troop deployments in the hope of taking back the rebel-held territories. However, the armed conflict between the Ukrainian military and rebels has turned into a stalemate. Since October 2021, Russia began mobilizing troops and military gear near the eastern border of Ukraine and Belarus, which has resulted in a full-blown armed standoff between Kyiv and Moscow. Satellite images confirm that both sides have amassed more than a hundred thirty thousand troops on the eastern border of Ukraine. Geopolitical experts and US intelligence have warned that a Russian invasion is imminent. Meanwhile, the diplomatic negotiations are in full swing largely under Normandy format, with separate negotiations between Russia and United States also underway. Most recently, Russia has sent some signals of its possible willingness to take steps towards de-escalate the situation. Nevertheless, the tension continues and it becomes imperative to understand Russia’s geostrategic calculus in this regard.
The Tyranny of Geography
To comprehend the Russian rationale for preventing Ukraine from joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or getting under the western fold, an appraisal of the “geo” of Russian geopolitics is a sine qua non. Its importance is demonstrated in an article on 12 July 2021 by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, explaining the spiritual, geopolitical, political, economic, historical, and cultural significance of Ukraine for Russia. The territory of Russia shares a 20,000 km (about 12427.42 mi) border with 16 states, 12 of which are former Soviet republics, which presents a massive security liability for the Kremlin. The elephantine geography of Russia is well guarded from the three sides due to Russia’s geography and strategic enclaves.
In the east, there is the untraversable Siberian coast, where the Bering strait separates American territory of Alaska and Russian territory. The distance between the two is approximately 122 km (about 75.81 mi) across the Bering strait, but the distance from the eastern tip of Siberia to Moscow is 6500 km (about 4038.91 mi), coupled with sub-zero temperature for the most part of the year. This immense strategic depth to the east of Russia’s European core makes an invasion through this route unthinkable for any of its adversary’s forces. In the Far East region, Russia maintains a heavy military presence at the Kuril Island and the Kamchatka Peninsula, which helps it keep an eye on the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan (East Sea), respectively.
Across the southern flank, Mongolia and Central Asian republics become the buffers and the Caucasus mountain ranges act as natural fortress. In the north, the Arctic region as of now continues to serve as a formidable barrier; and in the northwest, the GUIK gap (a free sea between Iceland and United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Norwegian territory of Svalbard and North Cape, serve as chokepoints. Russia’s large fleet of submarines and naval presence at Murmansk and Arkhangelsk makes an invasion from the northwest a strategic nightmare for any navy in the world.
About 80% of the Russian population resides in the western Russian plain (a continuum of eastern European plain), where the major political, business, and military centres are located, making it the Russian heartland. Any change in strategic balance on the western frontier of Russia threatens the security of this Russian heartland, presenting an existential threat to the Russian Federation. Thus, the eastward expansion of NATO exposes the wide flat western Russian plain to a large-scale land invasion through Ukraine.
The literal meaning of Ukraine is “borderlands”. It has always been a buffer and highway of invasion for forces invading Russia. The eastern border of Russia from Estonia to Southern Ukraine consists of 2000 km (about half the width of the United States); even with 12,000 tanks, it will be difficult for Russia to halt a NATO offensive. This explains the Russian rationale behind annexing Crimea in the Black Sea coast to its south and maintaining Anti-Access/Area Denial weapons at Kaliningrad military enclave in the Baltic coast to its north. These two points flank the non-Russian part of the eastern European plain and act as deterrence for invasion through this route.
Furthermore, an invasion through Ukraine threatens the Volgograd gap, a narrow stretch of land giving Russia access to the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Closing this gap is tantamount to choking Russia as Moscow depends on the Black Sea for accessing the Mediterranean Sea and beyond for all-weather import and export. In both the World Wars, Germans tried closing the Volgograd gap. The deadly battle of Stalingrad during the Second World War was successfully fought by USSR to stop Nazi Germany’s capture of the Volgograd gap.
Domestic Political Considerations
Layered on top of this geographical context is the domestic political rationale behind the crisis. After the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Putin’s approval rating dropped to its lowest since 2012, according to a poll conducted by Lavada Center. This declining rating has soared ever since the current crisis over Ukraine escalated. According to a study conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, only 28.2% of Ukrainians approve of President Volodymir Zelensky’s performance, with the disapproval rating at 56.1%. The study also found that a staggering 71.1% of the population believes that the country is headed in the wrong direction. Sporting a belligerent posture can help Zelensky garner more domestic support. The same is true for Putin as well, especially in the wake of the recent nationwide protests in Russia.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian domestic instability is also growing. The French and German brokered Minsk Protocol was signed by Russia, Ukraine, rebel leaders and OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea, and was followed by Minsk-II in 2015. The ground zero in the Donbass region is supposed to be governed by these protocols. Although there has been constant ceasefire violation from both sides, the protocols have been largely successful in preventing the conflict of the Donbass region from spilling over to the wider region.
Donetsk and Luhansk regions are yet to get autonomy mandated by Minsk Protocol. With Russia and Ukraine mobilizing heavy weapons close to the “security zone,” the protocol is almost defunct. Moscow started issuing Russian passport to the Donbass citizens on fast-track mode since April 2019. By 7 May 2021, over half a million passport has been issued, making Donbass a Russian passport protectorate. It is a political tool which can give legitimacy to a possible Russian invasion.
Military Dynamics and Russia’s Strategic Thinking
It is believed that Putin is taking advantage of the prevailing geopolitical situation as the United States is focusing on Indo-Pacific, the cohesion amongst NATO members has become increasingly diluted, and the European security architecture appears weak. However, the Ukrainian crisis may strengthen the legitimacy of NATO and the need for a stronger security architecture for Europe.
As far as force structure is concerned, there exists some numerical parity between Russia and Ukraine in terms of deployed troops. However, Russia can mobilize its reserve forces quickly and reorient its force structure swiftly compared to Ukraine owing to its superior military capabilities. The Ukrainian troops are wary of the eight year long war and with no hope for any substantial gain, their morale is low. In addition to this, Ukraine operates old Soviet-era military equipments – the weaknesses of such systems are well known to Russia.
Although a Russian invasion of Ukraine is highly unlikely, Putin seems to be using military muscle to push hard on the West to gain major political concession, especially regarding the “security guarantee” for halting the eastward expansion of NATO. The choice of timing for escalating the conflict is crucial as Europe is dependent on Russia for one-third of its fuel needs; natural gas is a valuable commodity in Europe for bone-chilling winter, making centralized heating a necessity. Putin may be interested more in keeping eastern Ukraine destabilized rather than taking over Ukraine. This is because holding the Ukrainian territory will become a strategic curse for the Russian Army. Putin will have to confront a massive nationalist insurgency if he decides to take over western Ukraine across the Niebur river. Moreover, Russia is all too familiar with Soviet Union’s experience with Afghanistan, and would therefore be loath to carry out such a strategic mistake.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.
Shishu Raj is a Masters student at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education
