Many intellectuals and scholars studying the Af-Pak region have talked about the multiple dimensions of this region. Numerous articles, books and monographs pertaining to this region are being published on a frequent basis across the globe. Also, a lot of aid in the form of money and weapons from many diplomatic missions has flooded Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. However, rather than arriving at a possible solution to the problem being faced by this region, the complexity of the issues has increased further. Here, complexity refers to the intrinsic confusion regarding the basic nature of social dynamics of the society in question. From centuries, the Af-Pak region has been home to different religions, sects and ideologies. The heterogeneous civilization of the ancient period has lived by respecting each other’s beliefs, barring a few exceptions. This was a time when politics did not affect the usual behaviour and attitude of the people towards other societies. Geopolitics introduced the idea of ‘interest’ in a region that was much more complex than a nation. The modern idea of ‘interest’ first brought the concept of the ‘nation’ into the region and thereafter diversified it on the basis of ‘national interest’, a concept that is closely associated with ‘power’. This is where more players came into existence and complicated the region in a negative way. Why did this happen?

 

Are Behavioural Changes an Outcome of Geopolitics?

 

In Social Sciences, one asks only those questions to which answers are known or could be found. As Ahmad Rashid wrote in his very famous book Taliban: Islam, Oil and The New Great Game In Central Asia that, “For few countries in the world is it more true that geography determines history, politics and the nature of a people.” (Rashid, 7) Here one needs to stress on the ‘behaviour’ of the people because nations and civilizations have been raised, flourished and finally destroyed by the changing nature of the people who belong to them. For the first time, after the Iranian revolution, the importance of the Af-Pak region suddenly increased and the major powers started looking towards a new emerging Heartland in the World Island, with the changed dynamics of the Cold War during those days. Increased geographical importance immediately triggered behavioural changes initially in the ruling class, the intellectual class and then among the common people. It initiated the construction of a new ideological base to attain political goals in the coming future.

 

The strategic failures of the British, the Soviets and now the Americans is always criticized on the basis that they had not understood the complex character of the common people of this region; and that was the reason for their failure. The Great Britain, the superpower of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, had conquered half of the world and ruled more complex societies like India, but failed in Afghanistan. The erstwhile Soviet Union politburo was filled with social scientists. It was credited for understanding the psychology of people most effectively, based on their Marxist scientific interpretations, and ruled many parts of Europe and Asia, but they too failed in Afghanistan. The US has the largest number of quality think tanks and academicians ‘analysing’ this region for a long time, but the country still does not seem to be anywhere near victory in Afghanistan. Is it so difficult to understand the character of the people and the politically active local actors in the Af-Pak region?

 

Who Constitutes the Region?

 

For the past few years, there is a more or less similar situation on both sides of West Asia, in Afghanistan as well as in Syria. Both states are surrounded by and contain complex societies of sects and ethnicities.  Three important players that constitute West Asia and make a triangle are Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan on the ridge of land, separating populations ideologically. The remaining two states are, Saudi Arabia and Iran, of which, the former is a monarchy, and is struggling to keep itself immune to the wave of Jasmine Revolution. The latter is the only country in the Islamic world which has a comparatively strong base of democracy and political stability. By fighting long diplomatic wars with the western states and facing severe sanctions because of its nuclear programme, Iran has succeeded to maintain its significance in the region and influence politics in Syria and Afghanistan. The talks between Iran and P-5+1 countries that started in November 2013 could activate Iran into international politics again. This new development will bring down the geopolitical importance of Pakistan but not of Afghanistan. To maintain its geopolitical relevance, Pakistan is changing its tactics and bringing Saudi Arabia into the rebalancing act against Iran. Afghanistan will continue to be the playground of this ‘great game’. Once again, the importance of geography has been asserted and the region has been brought back to the game.

 

Looking at the actors that are on the ground and giving some political shape to the region, one can easily analyse the changing equations in the last decade. A statement given in 1956, in one of the Soviet Propagandist books explaining the reason behind the instability in Afghanistan says, “The religious sentiments, national traditions of Afghanistan, its policy and way of life are subjected to unfounded criticism full of political ill will.” (Ashitkov, 64) Further it emphasises that the so called ‘Afghan Question’ is just an “absence of common sense, to an irresponsible and unserious approach on the part of those who raise this question.” (Ashitkov, 23) This unserious approach brought the larger area of Pakistan and Afghanistan on the edge of collapse of human security. If the earlier multilateral approaches had been taken into account, one can see that they largely failed and in essence, complicated the situation. Now each and every actor is trying to deal with another unilaterally, for example, Afghan government with Afghan Taliban keeping the US aside.

 

According to one of the documents dealing with national security policy of Afghanistan between 2010 and 2012, the Afghan government had been emphasizing on national reconciliation and reintegration of the armed opposition during the period. At the same time, the US was targeting senior Taliban elements. Further, the same document has highlighted the fact that in the next three to five years, the external and internal factors giving rise to insecurity could not entirely be eliminated. The only solution they found is reintegration and therefore, they moved towards improving capabilities for this purpose.

 

The Afghan government knew that in the future their national interest will clash with the self-defined geopolitical interests of its neighbours. While knowing this, the Afghan security setup could not have narrowed down their definition of security to physical and border security alone, rather they had to look after several social, political, economic and environmental forces that dominate the individual and the community at large in the country. The government has failed in this task because of the geopolitical factors that have been influencing peace and stability in the region. This has forced members of the Afghan political establishment to change their minds. And now, President Karzai is trying to follow the same path by dealing with the Taliban individually, keeping aside Loya Jirga which represents the Afghan people and tribes. Jirga is in favour of signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US. But how can thousands of NATO-led security forces and the Taliban share the same platform?

 

In Karzai’s view, excluding the Taliban from the future political establishment is not good for Afghanistan’s stability, which has been proven by his recent steps. From the report, which was published in the New York Times on February 3, 2014, it is clear that personally Karzai would endorse reconciliation with the Taliban and the rest of the official setup would favour signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US. This will give him the chance to play in both the teams at a time and keep options open after 2014. There will not be a BSA with the stamps of both Taliban and the US. However, it would pave the way for Pakistan, Iran and the Northern Alliance to play a critical role in Afghanistan and in this, the Iran-US deal is of utmost importance.

 

State or Non-state?

 

It is a known fact that Taliban had been supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and a few Western states. Pakistan played its card to deepen its strategic depth by nurturing the Taliban in Kabul; in return the Taliban used Pakistan to increase their strategic depth on either side of the Durand Line. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has played the supportive role in helping the strategic brain of the Taliban grow, in the form of four shuras (councils) viz., Quetta Council, Gardi-Jangal Council, Miranshah Council and Peshawar Council. They have brought most of the tribal and criminal groups together, which include students from Madrassas, and people who have not been happy with the government’s policies. In this process, religious schools have played a very important role. In 1971, the estimated number of religious schools on the Pakistani side was 900; during Zia’s time, the number of registered madrassas increased to 8000 and unregistered ones to 25,000 (Rashid, 89). Today, the estimated number of religious schools in Pakistan stands at around 30,000 to 40,000 including 5,000 Deobandi Madrassas (Pakistan Security Report 2013).

 

Such a huge conglomeration has gone out of control of the Pakistan Army and Intelligence services. Until 2000, one could argue that Pakistan’s political setup could understand the complexity of the region and exploit this to fulfil its ulterior national interests but now the situation has altered. Recent developments indicate that Pakistan’s government itself in a dilemma on its policy towards the Taliban. For instance, the government is not decisive about holding talks with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or starting military offensive operation in North Waziristan.

 

The reason for this confusion with regard to the Taliban in the minds of strategists all over the world is the birth of a new terrorist organization called the TTP, which is a synthesis of the war between the communist Afghanistan and the West supported Taliban. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) came into existence in 2003 and now it is fighting in Syria and it is more radical than any other Islamic groups that are fighting in the region. Within Taliban, the core Islamic faction – called ‘Takfiries’ – is trying to dominate other groups and control the entire game of politics; and this is what the TTP is trying to do.

 

The Afghan Taliban is more of a political entity while the TTP is a terrorist organization based on the same ideology of the Taliban but with different goals; and it provides umbrella for other terrorist organizations in Pakistan like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and possibly Harkat-ul-Mujhideen. They get support from the Haqqani and Mansoor networks, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, al-Qaeda and other flitted factions of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. These groups are active in Afghanistan and they carry out deadly operations; for example, the Haqqani Network, which is behind most of the suicide attacks in Kabul. Their main focus is to bring under control the residents and territories of the provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khosta and they also have setups in the Tora-Bora range (National Security Policy of Afghanistan 2010-2012). The HIG is also very active in Karam Agency, south-eastern Afghanistan, including Maidan Wardak, Logar and Kapisa provinces. In 2008, the HIG was ready to begin talks with the Afghan Government and seek power in the political establishment but nothing happened.

 

Muzaffar Ahmed, who was the chairman of the National Awami Party, stated in 1981, “I believe that there can be no talk of withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan before armed aggression against Afghanistan by neighbouring states stops. Otherwise, the very existence of Afghanistan as an independent state will be endangered.” (Ashitkov, 143) One of the columnists of The News claimed in his article, “A deal with America would mean no deal with the Taliban. A deal with the Taliban would mean no deal with the Americans. They were both his enemies. But Karzai had to choose the lesser of these two enemies.” America is also dealing with the Taliban bilaterally. The Taliban office in Doha still exists. Nothing has changed; everyone is dealing with each other depending on capacities, needs and positions.

 

Yes, the Af-Pak region is full of complexity and strategists have failed to understand this complexity. Whenever they have tried to come to a conclusion about the situation in the region in the past, the opposite has occurred. It is possible to reach a solution by understanding the region through the anthropological and sociological lenses rather than by just applying strategies based on geopolitical underpinnings. However, there are some problems that may not necessarily have a solution or are meant to be resolved. Politics in the region has been driven by relative powers by changing the characters of the ‘actors’ – common people as well as leaders – for decades and while doing so, these powers have maintained distance from them. On a very few occasions, international state actors active in the region find themselves dragged into the field, like Pakistan.

 

References:

  1. 1. Ashitkov V, Gevorkyan K, Polonsky A, and Svetozarov V. The Truth about Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports. (1981). Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow.
     
  2. 2. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (October 2010). National Security Policy of Afghanistan 2010-2012. The Office of National Security Council.
     
  3. 3. Pakistan Security Report 2013. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).
     
  4. 4. Rashid Ahmed. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great game in Central Asia. (2000). I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, New York.
     

 

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.

 

 

 

Shreyas D. Deshmukh, Research Intern, South Asia Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)