The Korean Peninsula was always strategically important for China as a geopolitical buffer. At certain phases during its imperial era, China had exercised varying levels of control over the territory – from suzerainty to occupation, under dynasties like the Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing. The territory helped China keep Japan’s expansionist ambitions away from the Chinese mainland. At the same time, it acted as a bridgehead to project China’s cultural influence on the island nation and integrate it with the Sinocentric East Asia. During the early part of the Cold War, North Korea was a fraternal Communist neighbour, which insulated Maoist China from the capitalist system of South Korea and Japan. It also pushed the battle lines of the Cold War away from China’s borders, when the US military bases were established in the two countries. China fought in the Korean War of 1950-53 to protect North Korea from being invaded by the US-led, UN backed forces, to maintain this strategic buffer space. This war was fought by China even with the Soviet Union failing to comply with its commitments of military assistance. Hence, Mao Zedong referred to China’s relationship with the Kim Il Sung regime in North Korea as being as “close as lips and teeth”.
Six decades later, the analogy does not seem to be holding well. The relationship between China under Xi Jinping and North Korea under Kim Jong-un present a very contrasting picture, in light of the ongoing scenario in the Korean Peninsula. Of late, China is seen to be distancing itself from North Korea and tightening the screws on its neighbour economically as well as diplomatically, in light of the latter’s intensifying pace of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests. China has supported multiple sanctions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) against North Korea’s nuclear testing. China has also introduced a ban on coal imports, in addition to supposedly considering an oil embargo, in response to the destabilizing activities of North Korea. The state media as well as some of the leading academics in China have started criticizing North Korea in lieu of Pyongyang’s muscle flexing as well as its unusually hostile rhetoric against Beijing. Consequently, an unprecedented perspective has evolved within the strategic policy and academic circles in China, reconsidering the long standing alliance between the two countries. In this context, it is worthwhile to explore the multiple factors that have been transforming China’s perceptions of North Korea.
The nuclear dimension is perhaps the primary factor which has necessitated China to change its policy with regards to North Korea. The first signs of the rift can be traced back to the period after China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. Kim Il-sung had then requested Mao for the technology required for making nuclear weapons, which was denied. When North Korea finally managed to acquire nuclear weapons technology and testing started in 2006, China reacted by supporting the sanctions against it at the UNSC. This was repeated for North Korea’s 2009 and 2013 tests, as well as the two tests of 2016. China has, thereby, visibly displayed its displeasure with its neighbour acquiring nuclear weapons. Other factors have superimposed on this fundamental divergence, and have hastened the rupture of the alliance.
North Korea is acting as an impediment to China’s growing geoeconomic ambitions in the region. China has currently established its Belt and Road Initiative to enhance connectivity between the various regions in Asia, Europe and Africa. However, its own Northeastern neighbourhood composed of South Korea and Japan is continentally disconnected even though a major weight of the Asian as well as global economy is concentrated in the region. Throughout the past nearly four decades, North Korea had physically separated China from the prosperous South Korean economy and thereby preventing the region from unleashing its full economic potential. China’s efforts to export its developmental model to North Korea also has clearly not gained traction, as Pyongyang continues to obstinately proceed on its autarkic ideology of “Juche”. Moreover, as China’s economy is slowing down and it seeks to elevate itself to the next level by boosting innovation and services as well as cutting down overcapacity in the traditional heavy industries, the significance of North Korea’s raw materials and cheap labour seems poised to diminish.
China’s global image makeover is another factor which impinges on its growing frustration with North Korea. China, being a permanent member of the UNSC as well as currently evolving as the “de-facto leader of globalization”, is at a position where it has to take decisive measures against an increasingly assertive North Korea. China had initiated the Six Party Talks in 2003 to negotiate with North Korea towards denuclearization; the failure of which in 2009 was a setback for China. At the same time, there is constant criticism against China for not doing enough to stop North Korea’s military buildup and even possibly providing covert assistance to North Korea in developing its strategic programme. It has been revealed even in UN reports that certain Chinese firms have been acting as front companies for North Korea to procure advanced Western dual-use technologies and thereby bypass the sanctions. In addition, China’s consistent opposition to international criticism of North Korea’s human rights record negatively impacts its global standing. Hence, North Korea’s attempts to fortify itself have been at the cost of China’s international image, which the latter is increasingly becoming conscious of.
The trajectory of the relationship between the two countries seems to be directly linked to the rapport between its leaders. Kim Jong-un appears to move in a radically independent direction when compared to his predecessors, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, who were largely acquiescent to China. Kim Jong-un, despite being in power for half a decade, had broken with convention and had made no attempts to personally meet his Chinese counterpart. Xi Jinping, therefore, has to deal with an ally whose leader, he has no personal communication with or hardly any understanding of. This, by default, has lowered the warmth of the relationship carried forward for decades, making China more and more impatient with North Korea. Moreover, China is barely used to dealing with a North Korean leadership on an equal footing, which Kim Jong-un seems to have a preference for. It has to be noted here that Kim Jong-un’s apparent orders to execute his uncle Jang Song-thaek and assassinate his estranged half-brother Kim Jong-nam, seems to be linked to his fears about China trying to control the levers in Pyongyang. These developments have certainly played a key role in driving a wedge between the Chinese and North Korean leadership.
The deterioration of the regional security situation seems to be the most immediate factor affecting China’s attitude towards North Korea. The US has deployed two launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in South Korea to intercept any offensive North Korean missiles. China had always been against any such plans, as the radar component of the THAAD is capable of detecting and tracking China’s use of its strategic forces as well. Thus, North Korea’s actions have adversely affected China’s deterrent forces vis-à-vis the US. China is in damage control mode so as to facilitate the rollback of the THAAD deployment, and its efforts seem to have aligned with South Korea’s domestic developments. The newly elected liberal President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, has suspended further deployment of the system due to domestic opposition as well as China’s concerns. China had been pressurizing South Korea to reverse its policy of allowing the deployment by imposing “unofficial” sanctions on the latter, which sees the former as a prized market for its goods and services. North Korea’s belligerence has also led the US President Donald Trump, largely seen as favouring retrenchment, to instead focus on a strengthened military posture in East Asia. There are also signs which indicate that Russia is mulling over getting closer to North Korea so as to fill the gap being left by China. Thus, the more confrontational North Korea gets, the more the regional security deteriorates as far as China’s interests are concerned.
These factors have therefore led to China adopting a rather less friendly or even mildly hostile approach towards North Korea. China has limits to how much it can go against its old ally. For one, China does not want North Korea to become its enemy. China also does not want the collapse of North Korea triggered by extremely tight economic sanctions, which will inundate its Northeast territory with millions of North Korean refugees. Moreover, China is still duty bound to protect North Korea in case of an external threat of invasion, as specified in the Sino Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961 and whose two-decade period was extended twice – in 1981 and 2001. However, China’s present commitment level appears questionable, since it does not seek to gain much from investing further in an uncontrollable leadership armed with nuclear weapons and having a “pariah state” tag.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.
Anand V, Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka.
