No First Use (NFU) and punitive retaliation have been core components of India’s deterrence based Nuclear Doctrine. As much as this is an a priori concept, the fact that New Delhi has never been embroiled in an all out nuclear war with either Pakistan or China, is testimony enough of its credibility. After all, it is argued that the only utility of nuclear weapons is to prevent a nuclear war in the first place. The question then becomes: at what point, does the state perceive the deterrence to have failed, to the extent of actively engaging the belligerent with a punitive retaliatory measure? Does a limited nuclear attack on a conventional Indian army battalion, 10 kilometers into the Pakistani sovereign territory, warrant a total destruction of Islamabad? Are the two scenarios mutually inclusive?
The previous Indian Government, under the stewardship of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh chose to focus more on the Indian civil nuclear energy strategy, largely ignoring the highly ambitious weaponization programme. Thus, in the last one decade, Islamabad has made comparatively more progress on its nuclear weapons technology, some of which are now in production and deployment mode. Islamabad has also very cleverly countered all of India’s defensive mechanisms, by investing in technology specifically targeted at these deployments. When India set up its first indigenous Air Defense Shield (ADS) Prithvi series of missiles, Pakistan retaliated by developing the Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology for its theatre ballistic missiles, the only known technology which can render any ADS useless. Then came the Cold Start doctrine, allowing the Indian troops to strike 50-60 km into the Pakistani border at a moment’s notice, thereby eliminating the timeframe required for any international objection, and reducing the retaliatory capacity of Islamabad. Tactical Nuclear weapons were primarily a response by Pakistan to oppose this threat.
Tactical nuclear weapons, in contrast to strategic weapons, are essentially miniaturized nuclear bombs and missiles, deployed and used for short range war theatre advantage. Pakistan recently tested its SRBM Haft IX (Nasr) missile, specifically developed to counter most advanced anti-tactical missile defense systems. Reports also suggest the Nasr is, in fact a modified Norico AR-series launcher procured from the People’s Republic of China, adding on to its credibility. Since March 2012, Pakistan has tested several short range delivery systems, indicating their prime target objective to be India. The Abdali (180 km), Shaheen 1-A (750 km), Ghaznavi (290 km) and the Nasr (60 km) are all believed to be nuclear capable. It also developed Ra’ad (350 km) and Babur (700 km) for Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) capabilities. In the last decade, most of Pakistan’s weapons development has been in response to Indian acquisition of advanced technology. This can be evidenced by Islamabad’s decision to invest in the MIRV mechanics, after India set up its indigenous ADS.
Despite its ‘lesser of the two evils’ character, the tactical nuclear weapons will be anything but that. These weapons will give Pakistan the recourse to lower its threshold for deploying strategic devices, i.e., the point at which nuclear weapons can be brought into a war. The paradoxical situation here is that although Islamabad is deploying a much smaller yield weapon, this will fast forward the escalation to a nuclear war. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons will add on little to the deterrence factor and will further complicate command and control. This can be overtly observed from the US and NATO experience with these weapons in the Cold War. Despite several claims that the Cold War scenario does not apply to South Asia, it is the looming situation of the region which requires all precedents and current policies to be given a close scrutiny, to evolve a feasible framework to counter any threat to the stability.
Also, unlike strategic nuclear weapons which are regulated by the central authorities to a large extent, the only way for tactical nukes to fulfill their intended purpose is by handing over their responsibility to forward stationed troops. In such a scenario, the risk of miscalculated and inadvertent launch becomes imminent, and cannot be ruled out as such. Ejaz Haider, a Pakistani strategic commentator, has bluntly stated on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons that the confused state of its Nuclear Doctrine, ‘essentially means we don’t know what the hell to do with them’. Although Pakistan is believed to have been keeping its warheads separate from the missiles, to the extent of even removing the central fissure coil from the warhead, all the components are under military command, thus facilitating a possibility for quick assembly of the weapon. This would also mean moving the warheads out of secure lockdown storages, thus making them more susceptible to accidental transport damage, or theft at worse. Non-state actors launching stolen nukes from Pakistani soil will be a quagmire Islamabad would never be able to come out of.
As historically noted, India and Pakistan, since turning nuclear, have always relied upon a third party, the United States, to mediate during times of conflict, and prevent an escalation to nuclear war. Pakistan’s declared security policy of first use, as per the option-enhancing policy, is an excellent if not the ultimate deterrent in theory. However, the rubric of first use unfortunately holds more than just actions, and also delves into consequences. The key point is not the yield of the weapon used by Pakistan, but the very fact that it is nuclear in nature. Once this line is crossed, even the US cannot dissuade India from waging an all out nuclear war against Pakistan, as explicitly outlined in its Nuclear Doctrine. Maybe that mushroom cloud over Islamabad will act as a catalyst for world leaders to look at revising the NPT with graver urgency.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.
Amit R. Saksena, Masters Student at the Jindal School of International Affairs, Haryana.
