Sino-Indian Border Dispute: The Impossible Settlement, and Need of a New Framework – Part 1 of 4

History is a contested space for political narrations, and no single country can lay undisputed claim over the narratives of past happenings. Sino-Indian border dispute falls under a similar realm of contested history. Despite sixteen rounds of talks between India and China on the ‘contentious boundary issue’, both countries have till date failed to come to agreeing terms on the issue of resolving border dispute. At the heart of this dispute is the month-long 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict that continues to retain significance to the tumultuous relationship between India and China. The ‘uncertain’ or ‘ambiguous’ reasons that led to the 1962 conflict have hitherto troubled policymakers from both the countries to negotiate any conclusive settlement. In popular discourses about the conflict, both countries accused the other of aggression guided by imperialistic ambitions. Whilst India accused China of unwarranted incursions and of illegally occupying Aksai-Chin,[i] China claimed to have acted in self-defence and counter-charged India of being a regional hegemon.[ii]

This four part paper-series examines the epistemological framework of popular discourses on Sino-Indian border conflict. To this end, the paper analyses several prominent scholarly writings that have examined the conflict through historical verification of claims and legal analysis of boundary disputes.[iii]Their works hold either of the two countries responsible accountable for having intruded into the other country, and therefore responsible for the 1962 conflict. Scholarly writings like that of K.K. Rao[iv], M.W. Fisher[v] and A.G. Noorani[vi] support India’s claim, whilst writings of K. Gupta[vii], N. Maxwell[viii] and A. Lamb[ix] support the claims of China on the issue of border dispute. These writings suggest a theoretical underpinning of ‘reductionist theories’, which implies that if the causes of conflict are removed then the effect (i.e. existing boundary dispute) could also be removed.[x] More pertinent, a neutral judgement on boundary issue based on legality and historicity would resolve the border dispute between India and China. On further analysis, many of these writings have their orientation in the ‘individualist’ approach. Explained by Hollis and Smith, this approach takes ‘State’ as the central factor for explaining events.[xi]Accordingly, the causes of the conflict are with the State (i.e. India or China), where a state’s motive, legality of claims and allegations of intrusion acquire central position.

This ‘individualist’ approach, as the paper argues, has further deepened the existing boundary dispute between India and China. The paper makes no claims to provide any factual reasons behind the 1962 conflict rather it attempts to challenge the state-centric approach of the public discourses; in other words this paper argues that the existing discourse on the conflict is bound to result in an inconclusive settlement between India and China. For this purpose, this paper analyses the claims, allegations and motives of both countries,to explore the flaws of this approach. As an alternative and more appropriate paradigm to analyse the issue of boundary dispute, this paper extends the analysis to the ‘holistic’ approach. Explained by Hollis and Smith, ‘holistic’ approach takes various systematic and external forces into consideration; for instance, inter-state alliances, balance of power and threats from nations other than those involved in a direct dispute.[xii]Unlike the individualistic approach where individual States acquire central position, holistic approach focuses on the international structure of which the States are part of. On Similar lines, Renaud Egreteau analyses the China-India relationship through the conceptual framework of ‘enduring international rivalries’.[xiii] This paper argues for an extension of this theoretical model to better understand the ongoing boundary dispute between the two countries.

To this end, the paper-series has been divided over four parts – the first part looks into the disputed boundary claims of India and China; second looks into the allegations of aggression by both countries; third problematizes the individualist approach; the fourth and the last part brings in the holistic approach, also the ‘enduring international rivalries’ to better understand the dispute. This paper-series conclude by claiming that the holistic approach is a better way to analyse the Sino-Indian border dispute towards envisioning any settlement between India and China on border dispute.

1. Disputed Claims by India and China: An Individualist Approach

The individualist approach views conflict in abstraction, as an exclusive inter-state event. Within this framework, scholars on Sino-India border conflict attribute the causes of war to either of the two countries. Their scholarly writings can broadly be categorized into two schools of thought – one that blames China for the conflict, and the other that blames India. Scholars supporting India’s claim characterized the 1962 conflict, primarily, as a result of Chinese aggression and betrayal against India.[xiv]Other factors, namely- the naivety of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in trusting the Chinese,[xv] and failure on the part of political leadership to strengthen the military forces, remain derivatives of the primal factor i.e. Chinese aggression. On the other hand, scholars supporting China’s claim rejected all of India’s allegations and accused India of behaving in an imperialist fashion.[xvi] Underlying both countries’ claim was the assertion of legitimacy on the border issue.

This section brings forth a scholarly conversation of claims and counterclaims on the legitimacy of boundary issue between India and China. The readings in this section are important to explore the usability of individualistic approach.

1.1. India’s Claim on Contested Boundary

The contested boundary areas between India and China can be categorized into ‘the eastern sector, where the famous McMahon Line lies; the middle sector, which is between the states of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh of India, and the Tibet region of China; and the western sector, which is in the Ladakh area of Kashmir [Aksai Chin], and through which China built a 100-mile highway linking China’s Tibet region with the Chinese province of Sinkiang.’[xvii] While the middle sector witnessed the first round of ‘diplomatic squabble’, the eastern and western sector emerged as the hotbeds of conflict.[xviii] According to the Indian claims, the conflict of 1962 resulted in loss of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin (in western sector) to China, while in the eastern sector the Chinese forces overran more than hundred miles into the country before withdrawing.[xix] India claims authority over these disputed boundary areas, and considers China as an illegal occupant of India’s Aksai Chin.

India’s claim in the western sector can be traced back to the ‘Ladakh – Tibet treaty of 17 September, 1842’,[xx] which was concluded between the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Tibet, and that the treaty had been acknowledged by the Chinese government in the year 1847.[xxi] The agreement declared Dogras as the ‘legitimate rulers of Ladakh’, and that the old established frontiers between the two parties were to be accepted.[xxii] Since then, ‘Ladakh has been an integral part of Kashmir.’[xxiii] Post-independence, after Kashmir acceded to the Indian union, India claims to have sovereign rights over the areas of Kashmir which included Ladakh and Aksai Chin. Treaties aside, India claims to have a traditional integrity with areas in the western sector.[xxiv] The claim is based on the pertinent references made to these areas in the ancient Indian religious texts of Ramayana, Mahabharata and Upanishads.[xxv] On the question of effective jurisdiction, India claims that because of the geographical location and topographical features of western sector ‘Indian government did not expect any kind of aggression across its frontier in this sector, [therefore] it did not think it was necessary to set up checkposts right up to the Sino-Indian border.’[xxvi]

Middle sector, though relatively less-conflict-prone than the other two sectors, was the emerging point of diplomatic imbroglio and military confrontation between India and China. India’s claim on these areas, especially in the disputed lands of ‘Chuva, Shipki La Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal’, was based on effective jurisdiction.[xxvii] In support of its claim, the Indian government produced ‘evidence such as assessments of land, revenue, and other taxes, census operations, maintenance of schools, construction of roads, and establishments of checkposts in this sector.’[xxviii] Further, the Panchsheel Agreement between India and China in 1954, as per India’s claim, symbolized China’s acknowledgement of India’s authority in the middle sector. Distinguished scholar C RajaMohan claims that the Panchsheel Agreement was essentially a trade accord between India and China on the issue of Indian trade with Tibet. The agreement specified six passes in the middle sector through which the trade and pilgrimage were to be carried out. India claims that these specifications in the agreement were an unofficial demarcation of border passes between China and India.[xxix]

In the eastern sector, the Indian claim goes back to the famous ‘Simla Conference’ of 1913-1914. The conference was hosted by the British authorities to conclude an agreement between China and Tibet on the boundary question ‘between Outer Tibet (nominally under Chinese suzerainty but administered completely by Lhasa government) and Inner Tibet (Tibetan-populated areas where Chinese writ would run).’[xxx] Indian government claims that the plenipotentiaries of Tibet and China came to a mutually accepted solution,[xxxi] and the British India plenipotentiary – Sir Henry McMahon – acknowledged China’s suzerainty over Tibet on the condition of Tibetan autonomy.[xxxii] In addition, Sir Arthur McMahon brokered a separate deal with Tibet that specified the boundary between Tibet and India.[xxxiii] The final draft of the conference, which enlisted all the boundary resolutions between India, China and Tibet, was agreed to by all the three concerned parties. India claims that the Simla conference concluded in the official demarcation of boundary between India and Tibet, what came to be known as ‘McMahon Line’.

However, as pointed by scholars supporting China’s claim, there were evidences that contradicted India’s legalistic assertions.

1.2. China’s Claim: Refuting India’s Assertions

Refuting all of India’s legalistic claims, China claimed that there had been no official demarcation of the boundary between China and India. However, China did acknowledge that ‘a traditional customary boundary line had long taken shape on the basis of the extent of each side’s administrative jurisdiction’[xxxiv] and it was on the basis of this traditional boundary line that China claimed authority over Aksai Chin in the western sector. Further, India was found unaware of the Chinese presence in the Aksai Chin region and of the ‘construction of gigantic highway’ in this region until 1958,[xxxv] which evidently dismisses India’s jurisdiction on this area.[xxxvi] On the question of treaty, China claimed to have never ratified the Ladakh – Tibet treaty of 1842. Moreover, as China claimed, the Ladakh – Tibet treaty was essentially a peace treaty, which had no specification on the boundary question.[xxxvii]

In the middle sector, China claimed that the areas in question fell within the traditional boundary line of China, and in its support produced ‘land-conferring documents, taxation papers, and census records.’[xxxviii] Refuting India’s claim about the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 declaring border passes between the two countries, China claimed that the boundary question ‘was not touched on at all’ in the agreement.[xxxix]

China’s claim in the eastern sector was based on the effective administrative jurisdiction of Tibet over the areas of NEFA, Tawang in particular. The Tawang tract was ‘inhabited mostly by Monpas who followed Tibetan Buddhism, [and] the Tawang monastery collected taxes and dues for its parent Drepung monastery of Lhasa [in Tibet].’[xl]Prior to 1914, ‘the boundary between British Assam and Tawang Tract was well known’,[xli] and it was only on February 2, 1951 that India took over Tawang.[xlii] In claiming the Twang tract, China refuted to having agreed to the McMahon Line in the past. China claimed that the McMahon Line was the result of a secret exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, and that the treaty was never officially ratified by China.[xliii] Also, the British Indian government was legally ‘debarred from singing a bilateral agreement with Tibet’ because of the ‘prohibitory clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907).’[xliv]Scholars have also argued against the very authenticity of India’s claim on McMahon Line.[xlv] These scholars claim that the Simla Agreement of 1913-14 was never a success, and McMahon himself had admitted that: ‘It is with great regret that I leave India without having secured the formal adherence of the Chinese government to a Tripartite Agreement.’[xlvi] It was only in 1938, under the instructions of the Foreign Secretary of British India – Sir Olaf Caroe, that the Simla Conference was declared a partial success which had fixed the North Eastern frontier of India.[xlvii] Volume XIV of the Aitchison’s treaties, which contained the Simla Agreement and based on which the Indian government made its claim in the eastern sector, was re-produced in 1938 with an imprint of 1929 containing fabricated information, while all the original copies of the volume were recalled and destroyed (Gupta 1974: 29; Maxwell 1972: 44; Anand 2012: 236).[xlviii]

On the whole, both countries claimed to have legitimate rights on the disputed border areas, and accused the other of violating into their territorial spaces.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.

Richard Toppo, independent researcher, working on the issues of foreign policy and internal security, Master’s degree in Contemporary India, University of Oxford. Maryam Aslany, PhD candidate at King’s College, London.