Shweta Shah is a Doctoral Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal, India.
The Pacific region is rapidly emerging as a critical theatre in the global contest over Deep-Sea Mining (DSM), an industry involving the exploration, extraction, transportation, and processing of the minerals retrieved from the seabed. In February 2025, the Cook Islands signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China for seabed mineral cooperation, sparking both domestic and international concern, including the suspension of NZ$18.2 million in aid by New Zealand. Shortly after, the United States initiated talks with the Cook Islands to cooperate on seabed mapping and mineral exploration, calling it “one of the most promising regions for deep sea mineral deposits.”
The urgency driving this geopolitical contest between great powers lies in the world’s rapidly expanding demand for natural resources. With the land-based reserves becoming limited and expensive to access without serious environmental harm, countries are turning to oceanic and suboceanic resources. Found at depths of 4,000-6,000 metres, deep sea minerals are available in the form of polymetallic nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, and seafloor massive sulphides. These resources contain cobalt, nickel, manganese and rare earth elements, deemed critical for the global transition to clean energy.
For the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), the stakes are uniquely high. Collectively, their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) cover nearly 27.8 million sq km, and they are geographically closest to the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone (CCFZ), a seabed expanse of 4.5 – 6 million sq km, which is the largest repository of polymetallic nodules in the world. Containing 23 million tons of nodules, the cobalt and manganese reserves found in the CCFZ exceed the global terrestrial resources by a factor of two, while the nickel is equivalent to half of what is available on land.
A critical distinction lies between DSM conducted within national EEZs and in the ‘Area’ beyond national jurisdiction, governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). While the countries are free to authorize mineral exploration and extraction within their EEZs, under Article 136 of UNCLOS, the resources found in the ‘Area’ are to be managed as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. This is where a significant governance gap exists. The ISA is yet to finalise a comprehensive mining code for commercial exploitation, a process that has taken more than a decade. The global debate on DSM is split between two major blocs. Major industrial powers like the US, China, India, and Norway alongside PICs like Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga are actively pursuing DSM. Whereas, in opposition, there is a growing bloc of countries such as France, Germany and the UK along with Palau, Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu that advocate for a precautionary pause on DSM until its environmental impacts are fully studied. The July 2025 session of the ISA also failed to reach consensus, amid rifts between proponents, opponents, NGOs, and mining companies. This regulatory vacuum has led to ambiguity and uncertainty, leaving impatient states to seek mining opportunities in domestic waters, which may or may not adhere to strict environmental standards.
Divisions over DSM are sharp within the PICs. The Cook Islands pioneered the world’s first Seabed Minerals Act in 2009, issuing 3 exploration licenses in 2022 to CIC Limited, CIIC (Cook Islands Investment Corporation) Seabed Resources Limited, and Moana Minerals Limited. Tonga, through Tonga Offshore Mining LTD (TOML), has held an ISA exploration contract since 2012 and in 2025, and has renewed its sponsorship agreement with Canada-based The Metals Company (TMC). Nauru, in 2021, triggered ISA’s ‘two-year rule’, setting a deadline for the ISA to frame exploitation regulations, an action that accelerated global attention on DSM. Kiribati is also actively seeking partners, including China to advance its DSM interests.
Conversely, Fiji, Palau, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Samoa, Marshall Islands, and most recently Papua New Guinea (PNG), following the failure of Solwara 1 – the world’s first commercial DSM project, have joined calls for a moratorium. French Polynesia has echoed this stance at a recent Pacific Islands Forum (a key regional organization for the PICs) meeting, declaring that, “we will not be guinea pigs for deep-sea mining if it goes full scale before the technology is ready.” Similarly, at the recent UN Oceans Conference in Nice, the Environment and Climate Change Minister for Solomon Islands, Hon. Manemahaga said, “The Solomon Islands will uphold a precautionary approach. We cannot afford to make irreversible mistakes in the deep ocean. We need science, capacity, and homegrown knowledge to guide our decisions.”
These diverging domestic policy choices pose profound risks for regional solidarity and the ‘Blue Pacific identity’ of the PICs. Recognizing this deep polarization, a High-level Talanoa (a traditional Pacific process for inclusive dialogue and collective decision making) was organized by the PIF in February 2025. A key outcome of the Talanoa was consensus on strengthening science, data, and traditional knowledge as the foundation for DSM governance. As of today, the Pacific Island Forum does not have an official position on DSM as the members remain divided. Another Talanoa with the objective of building a collective stance is scheduled for October 2025.
The situation is further complicated by great power competition. In April 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order expediting DSM permits in both US and international waters, to establish itself as a global leader in seabed exploration and counter China’s growing dominance in the sector. This order, based on a domestic legislation called the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act of 1980, created an immediate clash with the international maritime law, and drew sharp criticism from the ISA Secretary General Leticia Carvalho, who described this unilateral action as a violation of customary international law. While the US accepts and enforces other parts of UNCLOS as universally binding customary law; it has always rejected the ‘common heritage’ principle for the seabed. Critics note that this ‘cherry-picking’ of international laws sets a dangerous precedent that may result in other countries bypassing the ISA to pursue individual mineral extraction. This is immediately evident as TMC, one of the most aggressive proponents of DSM, has already submitted the first application under this US law for its NORI-D project, sponsored by Nauru.
China, by contrast, has worked extensively within the jurisdiction of the ISA, holding five exploration contracts, the highest for any state and is a major player in the critical minerals supply chain. It is currently looking to partner with the PICs to deeply embed itself in the region and benefit massively as soon as extraction guidelines are finalized. Regarding the case of US-China geopolitical competition in the region, many caution that the recently issued executive order, instead of countering China, will free Beijing to pursue its own seabed mining ambitions unshackled by restraints of international law.
Meanwhile, the momentum for global caution is growing. Environmental groups and NGOs across the world are warning that DSM could result in irreversible biodiversity loss. Thirty-seven countries, including France, the UK, Germany, and New Zealand, along with 880 companies such as Volkswagen, Microsoft, Google and Apple, have endorsed calls for a ban, moratorium, or precautionary pause.
It is deeply ironic that DSM is being pursued to mitigate climate change, while the very act of disturbing the seabed risks damaging the oceans, Earth’s largest carbon sink. In doing so, DSM may exacerbate the very crisis it is meant to alleviate. As the world approaches the halfway mark of the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030), the Pacific Ocean stands at a crossroads. The PICs remain at the centre of this unfolding crisis, caught between the promise of economic development and the threat of environmental degradation. The stark divisions on this issue put the vision of the ‘Blue Pacific Continent’ to the test. Should the region remain fragmented, the PICs will be vulnerable to the geopolitical agendas of the great powers. However, if the PICs arrive at a collective stance, they will set a global precedent for ocean governance and secure their shared heritage for future generations.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are personal.
