The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985 can be seen as an attempt to foster cooperation that never quite took off, in a region that has been marred by conflicts and animosity in spite of geographical and cultural similarities. The formation was initiated by Bangladesh's Ziaur Rahman and taken forward by India's Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto, in an attempt to overturn the hostility that characterizes the region. Political will to necessitate cooperation still evades most of its members. Mistrust and mutual threat perceptions still prevail and thus attempts have largely been aimed towards economic integration than political cooperation. The SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement of 1995 and 2006 respectively were launched to this effect. However, the eventual common regional identity that had been envisaged during the formation of SAARC has not been achieved by the organisation. Although it had been agreed upon at the inception of SAARC that controversial issues will be excluded from the organisation, countries have debated them on several occasions and delayed the progress of the organization. Pakistan has raised the issue of Kashmir at numerous SAARC Summits and Financial Ministers' meetings. Despite many burning issues in the region such as state-sponsored terrorism, ethnic tensions, and heightening of nuclear capabilities, SAARC managed to capture the attention of the strongest country in the neighbourhood – China, whose interest in the region was evidenced in the acceptance of the invitation to join SAARC as an observer in 2005 at the Dhaka Summit. The behind-the-stage linkages between Afghanistan's membership and China’s Observer Status brought to light China's growing influence in what India had for long perceived to be its sphere of influence. It also added to China's reassessment of its earlier stance on multilateralism, something it had got underway with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Its growing bilateral ties with South Asian countries added to its presence in the region. China has also expressed its desire to play a ‘bigger role' in SAARC, seeking people to people exchanges and strengthening cooperation between South Asia, South East Asia and China. What is China's strategy in South Asia? The forces of globalization have resulted in trade between many countries across the globe. SAARC, to that effect offers plenty. Free cross-border movement of goods, services and the abundance of labour translate into adequate economic gains. However, a closer analysis would reveal that SAARC has not been able to match up with its economic potential. As stated by leaders from corporate and trade sectors in the region at the South Asia Strategic Leadership Summit last year, SAFTA has delivered very little. China is not oblivious to this; its own economic benefits from SAARC have been limited. SAARC accounted for merely 2.7 percent of China's total trade in 2010.[i] China's intentions in South Asia can thus be inferred to be driven by more than economic reasons. One of China's major concerns in the region is the Indian Ocean, owing to the sea routes that hold Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories true even today. The Indian Ocean is home to the world’s busiest trading sea route today and China imports around 80 percent of its energy needs, most of which pass through the Strait of Malacca. It is learnt that China will continue to remain reliant on seaborne imports in the future as well, even if a share of the imports come through pipelines connecting oil fields in Central Asia, the construction of which are underway.[ii] In 2013, China released its 'blue book' which spelt out its strategy in the Indian Ocean. It states that although China's interests in the Indian Ocean are purely commercial, the efforts of India, China and the United States militarily could lead the Indian Ocean into an 'ocean of conflict and trouble'. Energy security lands atop China's priority list, as seen in its increasing cooperation with Pakistan and even with Afghanistan. Despite its apparent failure in Afghanistan, the United States' 'Pivot to Asia-Pacific' remains a matter of concern to China. The political hostility in South Asia offers a plethora of opportunities for external forces to garner a foothold in the region. The smaller countries in the region could not have asked for a more 'benevolent' partner who helps in their reconstruction activities and adequately rewards them for the strategic advantages they offer without raising issues such as human rights or democracy. China has been building roads in Nepal, express ways in Sri Lanka, highways in Bangladesh and has been investing substantially in Pakistan as well. In the last decade, China has doubled its exports to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka and has invested in large infrastructure projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars in these countries.[iii] SAARC, on the other hand is also expected to benefit from China's presence in the region. South Asia is an important and proximate market for Chinese exports. China and SAARC countries together constitute one-third of the global population. If China were to become a part of SAFTA, trade between China and SAARC countries would increase and the region will be able to attract investments in infrastructure, agriculture, machinery, manufacturing etc.[iv] SAARC countries can find abundant opportunities in Chinese markets too; and China's presence, along with that of a growing Indian economy, will also add credence to SAARC in the international arena. Trade in South Asia is generally characterised by high tariff levels aimed at protecting domestic industries, which suffer from a lack of financial, human, infrastructural resources. Enhanced trade within the region and with China would imply removal of all such tariff barriers and quotas. These adjustments will have to be made by China as well. While China exports iron, steel and fertilizers to South Asia, its prime imports from the region include cotton, ore, slag and ash. Protection of domestic industries will require good administrative and macro-economic measures by the respective governments in the region. Exports and imports will have to be driven by the needs of respective countries, increasing exports that can expand domestic markets, while preventing imports that can hamper them. Sensitive lists can be employed to this effect. As a region, SAARC stands to gain immensely from China's presence. This would require countries in the region to shrug off historical rivalries, parity complexes and insecurity dilemmas. The opportunity that unfolds is that of fostering greater engagement with a fast rising power and strengthening the region, while not having to compromise its position. Bilateral ties between China and South Asian countries, independent of SAARC will only lead to increased threat perceptions about China's presence in the region especially on the part of India. What implications does such integration hold for India? The general understanding is that SAARC has not been able to foster cooperation in the region owing to the consistent fear of the 'big power' that India is in the region, by its neighbouring states. Nepal and Bangladesh has preferred multilateral solutions for their water conflicts with India. Sri Lanka longed for assistance from SAARC in its internal conflict and for Pakistan it was a means of satiating its parity complex against India.[v] India's population, resources, comparatively huge economic growth and size of the landmass, have all contributed to this distrust. Cooperation among member states is to some extent hindered by this mistrust of India. The presence of China as a member can mitigate its speculations regarding India's growing friendship with the United States. A good counter to the fear of India would be to initiate China's membership into SAARC, which would give the impression to its neighbouring countries and China that India aims at the growth of the region as a whole. As witnessed across the globe, greater economic interdependence can also result in conflict reduction in the region. Interdependence creates fewer difficulties for states in acquiring resources as well. Cooperation also ensures recognition of mutual interests and acknowledgement of international rules, thereby largely reducing the likelihood of conflict. The rivalry between India and China could be mellowed to a great extent. A much larger working mechanism with China will help alleviate the ambiguity regarding China's intentions. This could promote greater engagement, transparency and enhanced mutual trust between not only India and China but also between India and its neighbours. India and China can coexist constructively in the region through SAARC by advancing mutual benefits and at the same time ensuring development in the countries of SAARC. This would require political will not just from India, but from other SAARC nations as well. Pakistan has endorsed the idea of China joining SAARC. Given the present circumstances, this can be perceived as a ploy to use China as a counter-balance to India in the region. China-Pakistan nexus has been seen as a policy meant for keeping India's great power ambitions within the region and it also poses difficulties to the implementation of this model. At the same time, such integration is likely to be welcomed by the other countries in the organization. The negotiations will have to be transparently held, with emphasis on the economic benefits than on contentious issues or threat perceptions. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal. [i] Kelegama, Saman. “China-SAARC Economic Cooperation: The Emerging Scenario”. Institute of Policy Studies. 2008. [ii] Lee John, Charles Horner. “China Faces Barriers in the Indian Ocean.” Asia Times. January 2014. [iii] Brunjes Emiley, et al. “China’s Increased Trade and Investment in South Asia.” University of Wisconsin-Madison. 2013. [iv] Energy China Forum. “China and SAARC: The Possibility of Economic Integration.” 2012. [v] Ahmed Zahid and Stuti Bhatnagar. “Interstate Conflicts and Regionalism in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges.” 2008.
Anu Krishnan, Masters in International Studies at Stella Maris College, Chennai.
