Within the canopy of a redefined “new great power relations”, primarily between the US and China, there appears to be a few obvious limitations to America’s strategic hedging against China in Asia. The limitations of America’s direct intervention in matters relating to China’s assertiveness in Asia came to the fore on two separate occasions in a matter of less than a month, towards the end of 2013. In what was seen as deliberate and provocative, Beijing declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed parts of the East China Sea. The declaration drew strong censure from many countries, particularly Japan, the US and South Korea. Within a month, effective January 1, 2014, Beijing came up with another geopolitical injunction. This new doctrine invoked restrictions on fishing for ‘foreign’ vessels in the entire South China Sea, creating many more speculations about China’s unrestrained maritime behaviour.
China’s new ADIZ covers almost the whole of East China Sea and encroaches on the ADIZs of Japan and South Korea apart from that of Taiwan. Both Japan and South Korea showed their anger at the newly declared ADIZs, apart from raising their pitch against what seemed like a clear violation of their own respective air space sovereignty. Washington’s mark of protest was limited to flying two unarmed, unescorted B-52 bombers above the ADIZ declared by China. The US did not take forward the agenda of backing its two allies against China, something that it considered to be a ‘unilateral’ decision by China.
The limitations of American intervention in the Asian security have been appearing often of late, particularly since the 2001 EP-3 incident, and have grown with the rise in China’s maritime assertiveness in Asia. The EP-3 incident in which an American aircraft was damaged and was forced to make an emergency landing, the Cowpens incident in which the USS Cowpens was ‘shouldered’ by a Chinese Navy Amphibious Dock Ship, the declaration of Chinese ADIZ, and most recently, the fishing regulations applicable to the entire South China Sea are instances revealing the chinks in the armour of the US’ Asian security grand plan.
The "Rebalancing" strategy of the Obama administration came infused with a sense of an anti-China promise and reassured the 10 odd countries of the Asia-Pacific which find dispute with China as a common factor, particularly the US allies in Asia, about a restructuring of the Asian security paradigm. However, in the aftermath of a resurgent Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict between China and Japan, China’s declaration of the ADIZ, and most recently, the fishing rules of China barring other countries to enter the South China Sea without its permission, recoil in US ‘rebalancing’ is already palpable. China has stuck to its position on each of these issues while the US has evidently stopped itself beyond a point. For the first time though, the US seems to be making a point that Japan, South Korea and other countries like India in Asia, would have to work out their own mechanisms to tackle China. Washington’s reluctance to go out of its way to side with the Philippines, when China took the Scarborough shoal in 2012, in spite of having a bilateral defence understanding with the former, showed the first signs of American failure to live up to its promise of ‘Rebalancing’ in the region. The other such signs are visible in the tacit American endorsement of a rearming of Japan and American failure to pressurize China to take back the declaration of the ADIZ in the East China Sea.
Clearly, a direct taking on of China by the US has got a thumb down by the American administration. ‘Rebalancing’ in Asia has clearly been impacted by the neo-liberal concerns of the US in Asia, particularly with China. The neo-liberal dimensions emanating from the interdependence of trade between US and China has stonewalled a free execution of the politico-strategic compulsions of the US in the Asia-Pacific. As a result of these restrictive undertones of neo-liberalism underlying Sino-US relations along with an assertive-cum-asymmetric rise of China, the need for an alternate security structure is vividly felt in the Asia-Pacific in particular and Asia in general. The central mechanism for order in Asia still happens to be balance of power, albeit much diluted in its understanding due to a mix of reasons.
Washington too, faute de mieux, has displayed an unsaid unanimity with the sans-China-Asian understanding of a multilateral and democratic bulwark against China. This concert of democracies primarily comprises four main members: India, Japan, South Korea and the US. Among these, India and the US have eschewed such positions which might portray them as being part of a "concert of democracies" working against Chinese interests. On the contrary, both South Korea and Japan have not shied from declaring their positions which could be seen as anti-China. The combative reaction of Japan and the declaration of its own ADIZ by South Korea, after the Chinese declaration, are cases in point here.
The speculation about an alternative security framework in Asia has been in reckoning among nations for some time now. The nature of this security framework is a multilateral mechanism with the aim of restoring the pre-China-rise balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. A major addition to this new security paradigm is the widening of its spectrum. In its new avatar, the new Asian security framework incorporates India and the Indian Ocean as an extension of the Western Pacific. India’s involvement, in an unprecedented way, with the countries towards its east, particularly, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Australia is for everyone to see. Apart from this, India’s desire to build an effective maritime patrol in the upcoming Indo-Pacific corridor reflects the changing roles of states in the region. A $100 billion credit line to Vietnam last year by India was for buying four patrol boats that would frequent the Indo-Pacific maritime expanse.
In the second half of 2012, India, US and Japan discussed trilateral cooperation in maritime security and a route through middle or north of Myanmar leading up to Hanoi. This was the third trilateral meet between these countries. All the three countries gave their strategic overview of the Asia-Pacific in the meeting, highlighting the importance of the region for the three countries. Besides, the tenth Track-Two Dialogue between the three countries was concluded in Tokyo in May, 2013.
Another emerging dimension of the evolving character of this new Asian security framework has been the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). The QSD which began in the year 2007 saw an unparalleled military cooperation among Japan, India, Australia and the US in the form of the Malabar Exercises. In spite of insistence on the contrary, objections to the exercise, and consequently its obviation by China has resulted in the lack of a repeat of any such military cooperation between these four countries. However, during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to India earlier this year in January, India extended an invitation to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for the next edition of the Malabar Exercise. The Indian Prime Minister’s declaration regarding the India-Japan ties that, “Our bilateral maritime exercises have now been established on an annual basis” is reflective of a pattern in this new Asian security paradigm.
Japan, led by its Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has been at the forefront of the efforts for creating of a new security architecture in Asia. The genesis of the Japanese desire for a new security architecture was probably spelt out for the first time in Abe’s speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007, which propagated the idea of the “confluence of the two seas”. The idea of the Indo-Pacific finds its roots in this speech of the Japanese Prime Minister.
Faced by a bellicose Chinese stand in the East China Sea and growing restrictions by China in the South China Sea, Japan has clearly decided to maximise its gains in Asia through strategic cooperation with other Asian countries. India figures prominently in such Japanese considerations. There is a new found bonhomie in the Indo-Japan relations. If there is anything that has made up for the lost grounds in the Indo-US diplomatic ties in the last few years, with the most recent diplomatic blip overshadowing everything else, it is the gains made in the Indo-Japan ties. In the last five years alone, the trade between Indian and Japan has risen by more than 80% to an $18 billion figure. Bilateral relationship between the two countries has got a boost in recent times through frequent bilateral visits from either side. This year alone has been marked by two high-profile visits from Japan. The Japanese Defence Minister, Itsunori Onodera, was on a four day visit to India in early January which was followed by Shinzo Abe’s visit to India as a chief guest to India’s Republic Day parade.
It seems that the Japanese Prime Minister, who has been called an ‘Indophile’, is living up to the essence of the sobriquet. With the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict aggravating in recent months, Abe is determined to reverse some of the post-WW II military policy pledges of Japan. The prospective sale of the Shinmaywa US-2 Amphibious aircraft to India, likely to be finalised in the next few months, is a glaring sign.
It is not a coincidence that China finds itself on the opposite end of the spectrum of this new security agenda in Asia, almost every time. A neo-realist understanding of the nature of an emerging new security framework in Asia will point towards a Japan that will look to consolidate its position vis-à-vis China through a strategic/defence cooperation with India. It remains to be seen how forthcoming does India project itself to be, when seen to be a part of an anti-China strategic cooperation in Asia.
The essence of this new security architecture in Asia will revolve around the developing bilateral cooperation between Japan and India and their subsequent efforts for a multilateral mechanism in Asia which will work towards regional peace, stability, freedom of navigation in Asian waters and an eventual balance of power that has tilted in China’s favour of late. The role of the US in Asia will most likely be that of a behind-the-curtain supporter of such initiatives by powerful Asian countries like India, South Korea and Japan, even as it will look to avoid a direct confrontation with China in Asia. This strategy of the US got obliquely reaffirmed when President Obama in this State of the Union address on January 28, 2014 gave, what many analysts believe, a lower priority to the “Rebalancing” strategy than America’s other foreign policy compulsions such as containing Iran’s nuclear adventurism and the pull out of US troops from Afghanistan.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.
Vivek Mishra, PhD Research Scholar in the American Studies Department at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
