The relationship between India and China, often known as the leaders of the Asian century is a complex one and is often labeled as a mix of cooperation and conflict. However, differences in approaches to nontraditional security challenges are rapidly becoming the reason for the relationship tilting in favour of conflict. The latest and additional arena for conflict is that of water.
The greater Kim Jong Un's success in 'peace diplomacy', the more difficult he calculates it will be for Donald Trump to push the red button that denotes a full-scale war of elimination of North Korea’s offensive capabilities.
The end of 2017 saw Trump administration on its charm offensive viz-a-viz India. India found itself as a main spoke in the Quadrilateral alliance, also including the US, Japan, and Australia. Trump during his Asia tour called for India’s leading role in the region. His administration’s first National Security Strategy further stamped that. Many commentators have cited that India will be more than willing to lap up this role in Indo-Pacific. This article explores two questions. Is India comfortable with bandwagoning alongside Trump’s America?
Introduction
Deterioration of Relations
Thirty one years—in the timeline of nation-building—certainly do not define a life time. Indeed, Mizoram Accord completed 31 years on 30 June 2017.
Barelvi Islam, a creed of a Chishtiyya school of Sufi order was established by Ahmad Raza Khan from Bareilly (1856-1921). Ahmad Raza laid the foundation of the Ahl-e-Sunnat movement in the sub-continent. Ahmad Raza Khan repudiated the Deobandis and Ahle Hadiths for their stances on shrines.
One of the measures that were expected to provide thrust to the “Act East” policy was the reopening of the historic Stilwell Road that had linked North East India to China through northern Myanmar during World War II. Constructed under the guidance of an American commander, General Joseph Stilwell, after whom it was christened, the 1079 km long road was meant to ferry military supplies to aid the war efforts of the Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese.
An important aspect that New Delhi must bear in mind when it enters into a ceasefire agreement with insurgent groups is that unresolved ceasefires over long durations could witness the emergence of an “over ground movement” with an anti-India agenda.
National security in the context of the North East cannot confine itself to only the myriad insurgencies that dot its variegated landscape. It must take into account the strategic encirclement that the region is heir to. Surrounded by China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal (the erstwhile Himalayan kingdom is placed a little afield, near the Siliguri corridor). 88 percent of the North East’s boundaries are international, with only 12 percent connecting it to mainland India. The borders in the North East must, therefore, lend itself to robust management.
