The US-led Iraqi invasion of 2003 under the pretext of thwarting an ongoing Iraqi quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) turned into a major debacle when the operations concluded with no evidence to prove their war objectives. Although the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom were embarrassed with the mishap, their respective intelligence agencies had to shoulder the criticisms for providing flimsy intelligence on which the decision to intervene was made. Ever since, the role of intelligence in preventing proliferation has been questioned – obviously clouding all the other successes like the Libyan, Iranian and Syrian cases. In this article, an assessment has been made of the role intelligence ought to play in containing the proliferation risk that Pakistan poses.
Intelligence, IAEA and Counter-Proliferation
Before going into the Pakistani proliferation issue as a case in point, an examination of the role of intelligence in counter proliferation is essential. When it is assumed that a country X is on the path to acquiring nuclear weapons, two questions need to be considered: What are the nation’s capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons? And, does the nation intend to acquire nuclear weapons? Intelligence agencies are required to be constantly in touch with the nation’s growing capabilities in scientific infrastructure, nuclear education and others. Capabilities are both open and concealed. While statistical data about the scientific progress of the nation may be available, the actual laboratories and nuclear facilities are concealed in secret places, which the intelligence agencies are expected to unearth.
But, the central role of the intelligence analysis is to make sense of one’s actions. Intentions of country X are harder to uncover. Therefore, intelligence plays a pivotal role in following the political movements in the country: making assessments of which political individual, groups or parties are inclined towards nuclear accumulation and which are not. Based on these assessments the international community can choose from a range of methods – like subversion and sabotage, economic sanctions, diplomatic and military action – to thwart the country’s efforts.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the nodal authority that oversees proliferation related issues. Scholars like Ogilvie-White have begun to advocate an independent intelligence office within the IAEA to effectively deal with nuclear threats. Such globalisation of intelligence has been criticised since it is against the established norms of the United Nations to allow one of its agencies to ‘spy’ – seen as defying sovereignty. Second, some developing nations see this as a plot by the developed world to deny them advanced technologies. So the practice till now is that IAEA gathers information from open sources, technical devices and some sample gatherings from the environment. For others, the IAEA is completely reliant on member nations sharing intelligence – which only arrives after the sharing nation has run a thorough cost-benefit analysis and deems that counter proliferation is in its national interest.
Pakistan’s Proliferation Threat – a Case for Intelligence Failure?
Both from the perspective of capabilities and intentions – even without the benefit of hindsight – Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons were easily fathomable. Beginning with intentions, Pakistan has had a stubborn obsession with India since its birth in 1947. By the time India conducted its first nuclear tests in 1974, Pakistan had fought two wars with India seeing unfavourable results. So, the global intelligence community should not have found it a mammoth task to guess Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Supplementing the intentions were reports of growing capabilities that showed the emergence of a nuclear-powered Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear quest was not just threatening the South Asian balance of power, but even global survival. The AQ Khan led proliferation network had spread its tentacles largely to Libya, North Korea and Iran, and minimally made inroads into numerous other countries like Sudan, Malaysia, South Africa, and Turkey among others.
The CIA made an assessment in 1979 about the concerns of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. Although the American intelligence were slow in identifying Pakistan’s nuclear progress, intelligence services of India and Israel had gathered sufficient intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear programme. India had begun to receive intelligence from Hungary; and in Canada and Germany about Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Indo-Israeli intelligence cooperation reached its zenith as Pakistan hastened its cooperation with Libya. French assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear plant in Kahuta was identified by Indian intelligence, but in vain. Ergo, Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities were tantamount to “action failure”, not an intelligence failure.
Globalisation of Intelligence vs. Unilateral Action
Nevertheless, in today’s context, Pakistan presents a much complex threat as a proliferator. What concerns the world is not just the vertical and horizontal proliferation that Pakistan has been involved in all these years, but also the potential threat of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organisations has been well-documented. Away from home, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has cooperated with any terrorist organisation (for example, the LTTE, LeT, JeM) that poses a threat to India. At home, Islamic radicalisation has turned out to be the Frankenstein monster that Islamabad created during the 1970s. Pakistan, today, is grappling hard with protecting its nuclear facilities from terrorist attacks, as seen in 2008 and 2012; and also, mounting counterintelligence measures to unearth individuals with extremist inclinations working in and around the nuclear facilities. In the future, though acquiring an intact nuclear device seems far-fetched, it is possible for terrorists to acquire highly enriched uranium, or construct and detonate radiological dispersion devices – also known as “Dirty Bombs”.
Globalisation of intelligence against proliferation is necessary, especially in Pakistan’s case, as the latter has layers of vulnerability of nuclear theft and accidents. It is an open secret that Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are a target of Indian and American intelligence agencies, and probably many more. If the globalisation of intelligence as envisaged by a few in the IAEA becomes real, then intelligence agencies can better share intelligence about the security weaknesses and other vulnerabilities that Pakistan’s nuclear facilities might pose to terrorist strikes, without having to worry about compromising their sources. Universalising of intelligence can also contribute to applying pressure on Pakistan to allow international interrogation of AQ Khan to assiduously comprehend the damage his network has caused. Nobody has any clue about the whereabouts of the materials shipped to Sudan through illicit trade from Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan is one of the objectors to the globalisation of intelligence.
While this is underway, there is also a strong case for unilateral action against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities from an Indian point of view. The example of Israel stands out in this regard. The 2003 Iraqi debacle had instilled a fear of action among the western leaders that they maintained a level of scepticism of intelligence on nuclear proliferation. This suggests their military inaction against Iran and Syria. But the case of Israel has been different. In 2007, Israel acquired intelligence about Syria’s clandestine heavy water reactors. Israel acted unilaterally by destroying the site. Israel’s Stuxnet programme of installing a virus in Iran’s centrifuges was also a unilateral action when the West worked on economic sanctions. Israel’s appetite for unilateral action comes from its stated objectives of survivability and regional peace. Even in India’s case, the immediate threat from Pakistan’s nuclear related business is for India. Unless India can present a convincing case, the West will not act against Pakistan – as we have seen for several decades now. Indian intelligence agencies must, therefore, take centre-stage in India’s fight against Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. It need not be military means, but several other ways that employ denial and deception methods.
[This opinion piece forms a part of an article series – “Pakistan and the Proliferation Axis” – of the Science, Technology & Security forum.]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.
Dheeraj P. C., M. Phil., scholar and security analyst with a focus on intelligence and counter-terrorism, based in New Delhi.
