Shalini Varma S is a second-year master’s student at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal, India.
Despite being one of the most resource-rich countries in the world and playing a central role in critical mineral supply chains, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has long been defined by chronic instability – particularly in its eastern regions and its strained relations with Rwanda. Repeated cycles of violence and fragile peace efforts have made eastern DRC a recurring flashpoint in the Great Lakes region. The latest Rwanda – DRC peace deal reflects not only an attempt at conflict management but also the growing involvement of external actors with strategic and mineral interests.
The Rwanda – DRC conflict and M23 Rebels
Tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are rooted in colonial-era borders, ethnic dynamics, and the legacy of regional conflicts following the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The genocide against Tutsis resulted in a Tutsi – led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government in Rwanda, while over two million Hutu refugees, including genocidal militias, fled into eastern Congo.
Between 1996 and 2003, eastern DRC descended into instability as armed groups and neighbouring states fought over political influence and the exploitation of natural resources like coltan and gold. This period culminated in the First and Second Congo wars, often referred to as “Africa’s World War”. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2003, several armed groups, including the Hutu-led FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda / Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and the Tutsi-led CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People) continued to operate in the region. The CNDP signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government on March 23, 2009, under which its members were to be integrated into the national army and political system. However, dissatisfaction over the failure to implement the agreement led former CNDP members to form the March 23 Movement (M23) in 2012. The group claimed to represent and protect Congolese Tutsis and accused Kinshasa of failing to address the threat posed by the FDLR. Although the rebellion was briefly suppressed due to international pressure and sanctions on Rwanda for allegedly supporting M23, the group re-emerged in 2021-22 and launched fresh offensives in eastern DRC.
The DRC, the United Nations, and Western governments have repeatedly accused Rwanda of backing M23, allegations that Kigali denies. Rwanda justifies its involvement by citing security concerns linked to the continued presence of the FDLR in eastern Congo. The conflict has also become closely tied to control over critical minerals. M23 reportedly seized the Rubaya mining area, a major source of coltan, and controlled trade routes through which minerals were smuggled into Rwanda and exported internationally.
The violence has displaced millions, particularly in North and South Kivu provinces, worsening an already severe humanitarian crisis. At the same time, the conflict has drawn growing international attention due to the DRC’s central role in global critical minerals supply chains, with both China and the United States seeking greater influence over the region’s mineral resources.
The Peace Deal
The June 27, 2025 peace agreement between Rwanda and DRC follows renewed escalation in the eastern DRC, where the M23 rebel group expanded territorial control in North Kivu, deepening humanitarian and regional security concerns. As fighting intensified, Kinshasa again accused Rwanda of providing logistical and technical support to M23, allegations that Kigali denied. Rwanda has justified its involvement by citing security concerns related to the continued presence of the FDLR in eastern DRC, while critics also link Kigali’s alleged role to its economic interest in the region’s mineral-rich territories.
After repeated failure in the ceasefire and the collapse of the Angola – led African Union (AU) mediation under the Luanda process, which aimed to de-escalate tensions between Rwanda and the DRC through dialogue and ceasefire agreements, diplomatic pressure intensified, particularly from the United States, with Qatar’s facilitating parallel negotiation. These efforts culminated in a negotiated settlement that explicitly rejects a military solution. The agreement rests on three main pillars: Reciprocal security commitments, political dialogue and economic integration. It mandates the neutralisation of FDLR by the DRC alongside Rwanda’s disengagement of forces, establishing a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism to monitor compliance, and includes a Regional Economic Integration Framework centered on transparency in Critical Mineral Supply Chains. Oversight is entrusted to a Joint committee involving AU, Qatar, and the United States.
Role of External Actors in the Peace Process
The Rwanda DRC peace process highlights the decisive role played by external actors in translating repeated ceasefire attempts into a formal agreement. While previous AU-led initiatives, such as the recent Luanda process under Angola’s facilitation, provided early diplomatic frameworks, they struggled to overcome mutual distrust and engagement gaps. In 2025, the United States assumed a more assertive role, combining diplomatic pressure with institutional coordination to revive stalled negotiations, supported by Qatar’s mediation channel, amid growing concerns over regional instability, humanitarian insecurity, and competition over the DRC’s critical minerals.
This external leadership helped align parallel negotiation tracks, including talks between the DRC and M23 in Doha. However, the reliance on non–regional actors underscores the limitations of existing regional mechanisms, including Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), in independently managing prolonged conflicts in the eastern DRC.
Critical Minerals and Strategic Interests
The prominence of external actors in the peace process cannot be separated from the DRC’s central role in global critical mineral supply chains. The DRC accounts for over 70 per cent of global cobalt production, and is a major producer of copper, both of which are essential for batteries, electric vehicles and clean energy technologies. It also possesses significant deposits of conflict minerals or 3TGs – Tantalum, Tungsten, Tin and Gold. Importantly, many of these resources, particularly coltan, are concentrated in eastern DRC, where violence has persisted for decades.
Chronic instability in this mineral-rich region has enabled armed groups to finance their activities through illicit mining, taxation of local populations and cross-border smuggling. Rwanda, while not possessing comparable reserves, plays a key role in regional mineral flows, particularly as a transit and processing hub for minerals originating in eastern Congo.
At the global level, eastern DRC’s prolonged instability has gained strategic significance as many of the region’s mineral-rich areas affected by conflict contain significant reserves of cobalt, coltan, gold and other critical minerals, and rebel control over them has drawn increasing international attention. China’s dominant presence in Congolese mining and processing has intensified Western concerns over supply chain concentration and strategic vulnerability, especially amid rising demand driven by clean energy transitions and electric vehicles. Initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership, along with renewed U.S. – DRC strategic cooperation on critical minerals, reflect broader efforts to diversify access, improve governance, and reduce dependence on a single supplier. From this perspective, stability in eastern DRC is not merely a security objective but a prerequisite for extraction, investment, and long-term strategic access to critical minerals.
Limits and Contradictions of the Deal
Though hailed as a milestone in the DRC-Rwanda relations, the peace deal suffers from several structural weaknesses. As noted by Samuel Byansi, the agreement relies heavily on principles and frameworks while offering limited enforceable commitments, reflecting patterns seen in previous agreements. The deal also follows a security first, politics later sequencing, prioritising the neutralisation of armed groups before reintegration – a strategy that risks reproducing earlier failures, given the DRC’s poor record in absorbing former combatants.
The ambiguous language used in certain sections of the agreement has also raised concerns among experts, as it may enable selective compliance, especially by Rwanda. Notably, the first 90 days focus almost exclusively on security implementation, coinciding with a deadline set by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights for Rwanda to respond to DRC-backed claims. This overlap raises the possibility that the agreement could serve as diplomatic cover for Kigali. Moreover, the deal’s limited attention to institutional capacity constraints and local community grievances underscores the need for sustained and deliberate external monitoring.
The Rwanda – DRC peace agreement reflects the convergence of regional security concerns, external diplomatic leverage, and critical mineral geopolitics. While framed as conflict resolution, the agreement also serves broader strategic interests based on supply chain stability and geopolitical competition. However, continued clashes, isolated shootings and repeated accusations of ceasefire violations in eastern DRC even after recent agreements highlight the fragility of the peace process and the persistent presence of armed groups in the region. Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the implementation rather than the intent, particularly in a region where past agreements have struggled to translate diplomatic consensus into sustained stability.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the article are personal.
